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RECENT MONTANA DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES--DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE-DIs-
CRIMINATION AGAINST WELFARE RECIPIENTS BECAUSE OF SOURCE OF UN-
EMPLOYMENT-In August, 1959, a strike closed down the copper industry
in Montana. Thereupon the State Department of Public Welfare issued
a general order concerning welfare payments "to meet the needs of people
who apply for general assistance as a result of the strike that now exists
in the copper industry." This order, as later modified, provided that "all
families qualifying for general relief as a result of the strike in the copper
industry shall receive public assistance at a rate not to exceed fifty per-
cent (50%) of the standard budget as established by the State Depart-
ment of Public Welfare." The order also provided that no assistance would
be allowed single men in the same circumstances. The District Court for
Silver Bow County issued a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the
State Welfare Board to rescind its order and to authorize the granting of
relief to all qualifying applicants upon an equal basis. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Montana, held affirmed. The orders of the State Welfare
Board discriminating against the applicants for relief because of the source
of their unemployment and need are contrary to the provisions of the Wel-
fare Act. State ex rel. International Union of Mine Workers v. Montana
State Department of Public Welfare, 347 P.2d 727 (Mont. 1959) (Justice
Angstman specially concurring, and Chief Justice Harrison and Justice
Castles dissenting).
This decision has been widely publicized and often misconstrued. Press
accounts indicated that under the decision strikers, per se, were entitled to
welfare allowances. Criticism was voiced that the Montana Supreme Court
had converted welfare funds into strike funds. Neither of these propositions
is correct. The issue whether or not members of a striking union were
eligible for welfare allowances was not before the court, for the orders
issued by the State Department of Public Welfare concerning the people
affected by the copper strike did not dispute the eligibility of these people
for welfare assistance. In fact, the orders impliedly recognized that many
such people would be eligible for aid? If welfare funds were in fact used
as strike funds, therefore, it was the result of the determination of the Wel-
fare Board that strikers were eligible for general assistance, a determination
not in question in this lawsuit.
The real question involved in this decision was whether, after determin-
ing that strikers were entitled to relief, the Welfare Board had the power
'Mr. Justice Angstman, in his concurring opinion, points out that the existence of a
union strike fund is a matter to be considered by the boards In their determination
of eligibility. Instant case at 739.
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 71-303 reads: "Eligibility for relief-In.
vestigation of resources. An applicant for assistanee including medical care and
hospitalization shall be eligible to receive assistance only after investigation by the
county department reveals that the income and resources are insufficient to pro-
vide the necessities of life, and assistance shall be provided to meet a minimum
subsistence compatible with decency and health."
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to grant strikers with families less assistance than nonstrikers equally
situated, and to exclude single strikers from any benefit while other single
men received aid. The majority opinions go on further than to hold that
under the Montana Welfare Act, which requires equal consideration of
applicants,' the board may not so discriminate. This holding did not order
the board to give welfare assistance to strikers at all, though the court
seems to imply that the board acted correctly in so doing. It merely re-
quired the board to give assistance to all eligible applicants on an equal
basis. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Castles goes to great lengths
in an attempt to impeach the validity of the majority holding. However,
the seemingly valid objections to the result are explained away quite
readily in the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Angstman.
The board urged also that a severe lack of funds necessitated the re-
duction of allowances to strikers and thereby made the orders valid. No
evidence was introduced to substantiate this contention. However, even if
such were the case the discriminatory orders would still be invalid. The
Welfare Department has power to prorate or reduce payments in order to
stretch out its funds over a longer period,' but under the statutory mandate
that all applicants receive equal consideration, any proration should be ap-
plied to all recipients.
The point was made and accepted in both dissenting opinions that it
was necessary for the relators to allege the availability of funds to carry out
the court's order. It is true that in a proceeding to compel the payment of
money, it must be made to appear that there are funds from which the
payment can be made.' However, the instant proceedings were not to compel
the payment of money, but rather to require the Welfare Board to cease
discriminating against needy strikers.
The propriety of the use of the writ of mandate in this proceeding was
also challenged. Mr. Justice Castles in his opinion stated that the "relators
are attempting to prohibit the Board from enforcing their order of Sep-
tember 22nd," 5 and went on to intimate that prohibition might have been
the proper remedy. It seems clear, however, that the petitioner was seeking
mandamus on eminently proper grounds. He sought to compel the board
to act in accord with its statutory duty-to grant welfare aid on an equal
basis to all persons eligible for that aid, regardless of the cause of their
need. To call this attempting to prohibit the board from enforcing their
prior order is to obscure the issue.
_Ueioir anly uiaaua '.naurco a,±c jjaa vn Iviu uana -U ,U vc±±av flt, I
exclude strikers from assistance, serious consideration should be given
to the policy behind the act. Article X, section 5, of the Montana Constitu-
tion provides: "The several counties of the state shall provide as may be
2REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 71-305 reads: "Equal consideration. Persons
eligible for and in need of relief shall be, whether employable or unemployable,
given equal consideration for public assistance as those persons eligible for as-
sistance under other parts of this act."
'State ex- rel. Dean v. Brandjord, 108 Mont. 447, 92 P.2d 273 (1939).
'State em rel. Blenkner v. Stillwater County, 102 Mont. 130, 56 P.2d 1085 (1936).
'Instant case at 742.
Idl. at 731.
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prescribed by law for those inhabitants, who, by reason of age, infirmity or
misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of society." It is
argued, with merit, that people who voluntarily leave their employment
are not beset with a misfortune which gives them a claim upon the sym-
pathy of society. But what about the families of such people? Certainly the
family of a man who is simply shiftless should not be and is not denied
aid or granted only one-half of the assistance necessary to meet a minimum
subsistence compatible with decency and health. The family of a man
participating in an ill-timed or prolonged strike is enduring as much mis-
fortune as anyone else if there is not amply food for the table.
G. RICHARD DZIVI
CRIMINAL LAW-MoTIoN FOR MISTRIA 1-- ExcLusIvE CHARACTER OF
CRIMINAL CODE--Defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree.
During the course of the trial, on four different occasions, the court denied
defendant's motions to direct a mistrial on grounds of improper questions
by the prosecuting attorney and of allegedly prejudicial testimony of a wit-
ness. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The denial
of the motions for mistrial was not error where the prejudicial effect of the
testimony and questions was cured by the trial judge's admonitions to the
jury. State v. Straight, 347 P.2d 482 (Mont. 1959).
Implied in the decision of the instant case is a recognition of the per-
missibility of a motion for mistrial, a motion not provided for by statute.
The court said, in passing, "Regarding the propriety of a motion for mis-
trial, see Hayward v. Richardson Construction Company."
Dictum in the Hayward case,' decided at the same time, expressly ap-
proved the motion for mistrial in civil cases and overruled an earlier case
which had held that "there is no authority in this state for making such a
motion, based on such grounds, nor any for a trial to make such an order,
on such grounds."' Justice Angstman in the Hayward case declared the
earlier decision to be contrary to the rule recognized throughout the country,
and announced the correct rule to be as follows :'
Whenever it appears that there has been such misconduct in a trial,
or prejudicial matter has been allowed to go to the jury, without
opportunity to object in advance, the effect of which cannot be re-
moved by an admonition on the part of the court, the aggrieved
party may move the court to declare a mistrial. Failing in that, he
will be deemed to have taken his chances with the jury.
In contrast, Justice Bottomly dissented from the majority statement
of the rule on the ground that there is no statutory provision in this state
1Instant case at 487.
'347 P.2d 475 (Mont. 1959).
'Robinson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 80 Mont. 431, 443, 261 Pac. 253, (1927).
'Supra note 2 at 480.
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